Is the Rebelartists Fortfi Treasury MCP server down?

mcp-registry/io.github.rebelartists/fortfi-treasury-mcp · v1.0.0

healthy
Last checked 2026-10-21 07:12 UTC · handshake 429ms

As of 2026-10-21 07:12 UTC, the Rebelartists Fortfi Treasury MCP server is up with a Glimind reliability score of 97/100 (grade A). Over the last 30 days it answered 100% of Glimind's liveness checks. It had 4 outages in 90 days, with a median recovery of 10 minutes.

uptime (30d checks)
100%
checks observed
4,048
outages (90d)
4
tools
133

Policy-gated MCP treasury for AI agents — x402 subscribe, 50+ tools, multi-chain.

Install Rebelartists Fortfi Treasury MCP server

Add to Cursor Add to VS Code

Claude Code

claude mcp add --transport http rebelartists-fortfi-treasury-mcp-server https://fortfiapp.com/api/mcp

Claude Desktop · Windsurf · Cline (mcpServers JSON)

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "rebelartists-fortfi-treasury-mcp-server": {
      "type": "http",
      "url": "https://fortfiapp.com/api/mcp"
    }
  }
}

Third-party server, listed as discovered. Review its source before installing.

Agent-readiness: D (60/100)

D (60/100): 0 error(s), 6 warning(s) across 133 tool(s); ~23,085 tokens of tool definitions.
Scores higher than 0% of 15,457 MCP servers Glimind has audited.
Its tool list costs an agent ~23,085 tokens per session — more than 95% of servers.
58 → 60 since 2026-10-17
no tool-poisoning patterns
Schemas100
Descriptions64
Safety hints0
Token cost35
Client compatibility70
Protocol40
Reliability100
Stability84

What to fix (8)

133 of 133 tool(s) carry no readOnlyHint/destructiveHint annotations.

Annotate read-only tools with {"readOnlyHint": true}. Agents and gateways can then run them without a confirmation prompt, and route around destructive ones. How to fix →

Tools: accept_cosigner_invite, add_recipient, approve_cosigner_action, approve_recipient, cancel_governance_change and 128 more

133 tools on one server. Tool-selection accuracy drops as the menu grows, and some clients (e.g. Cursor) cap the number of active tools.

Group tools by task into smaller servers or toolsets, and merge near-duplicates behind one tool with a mode parameter. How to fix →

102 parameter(s) across 49 tool(s) have no description.

Add a "description" to each parameter with its format and an example ("ISO 8601 date, e.g. 2026-10-17"). This is the commonest cause of wrong arguments on the first call. How to fix →

Tools: approve_cosigner_action, cancel_hyperliquid_orders, cancel_payment_request, create_merchant_webhook, create_vault_credential and 44 more

37 tool(s) look like they change state (create/send/delete/pay…) but declare no destructiveHint.

Set annotations {"readOnlyHint": false, "destructiveHint": true|false, "idempotentHint": …}. Clients use these to ask the user before a side effect and to auto-approve safe reads. How to fix →

Tools: approve_cosigner_action, approve_recipient, cancel_governance_change, cancel_hyperliquid_orders, cancel_payment_request and 32 more

Loading this server's tool list costs an agent ~23,085 tokens before any work — more than 95% of MCP servers.

Split rarely-used tools into a separate server or a toolset the client can enable, or expose one "search tools" entry point. Many agents load every connected server's tools into every request. How to fix →

Negotiates MCP 2024-11-05. Structured output, tool output schemas and elicitation arrived in 2025-06-18.

Upgrade the MCP SDK and negotiate 2025-06-18 or newer. How to fix →

No tool declares an outputSchema.

Declare outputSchema and return structuredContent (MCP 2025-06-18+). Agents can then parse results without guessing, and chain tools reliably. How to fix →

In the last 30 days: 0 tool(s) removed and 4 schema change(s).

Add new tools or optional parameters instead of renaming or removing; deprecate first (say so in the description) and remove later. Agents cache tool contracts. How to fix →

Auto-fix: 104 corrected tool definitions

Paste-ready definitions with the problems above fixed. Changes marked verify need a human look. 49 tool(s) still need parameter descriptions written by someone who knows the API. All of them as JSON: /v1/readiness/mcp-registry%2Fio.github.rebelartists%2Ffortfi-treasury-mcp/fixes

accept_cosigner_invite 1 change
{
  "name": "accept_cosigner_invite",
  "description": "Accept a pending co-signer invite. After accepting, you will be able to approve/reject pending actions for that account.",
  "inputSchema": {
    "type": "object",
    "required": [
      "inviteId"
    ],
    "properties": {
      "inviteId": {
        "type": "string",
        "description": "Invite id from list_incoming_cosigner_invites"
      }
    },
    "additionalProperties": false
  },
  "annotations": {
    "readOnlyHint": false,
    "destructiveHint": false,
    "idempotentHint": false
  }
}
add_recipient 1 change
{
  "name": "add_recipient",
  "description": "Add a payout address to the allowlist. Human developer key (frtfi_hu_* + DA): added with 24h cooldown (no Assist passkey). Agent key (frtfi_ag_*): GOVERN — funding-wallet signature required; then approved immediately.",
  "inputSchema": {
    "type": "object",
    "required": [
      "address",
      "chainId"
    ],
    "properties": {
      "address": {
        "type": "string",
        "description": "Wallet address (0x… or Solana base58)"
      },
      "chainId": {
        "type": "string",
        "description": "FortFi chain id (e.g. hyperliquid-mainnet). Omit when fromWalletId is set — network is inferred from that wallet."
      },
      "nickname": {
        "type": "string",
        "description": "Optional display name"
      },
      "challengeId": {
        "type": "string",
        "description": "Agent GOVERN: challengeId from the first call"
      },
      "fromWalletId": {
        "type": "string",
        "description": "Optional source wallet id (list_wallets). Sets allowlist network to that wallet's chain — use for HL sends without passing chainId."
      },
      "walletSignature": {
        "type": "string",
        "description": "Agent GOVERN: funding-wallet signature"
      }
    },
    "additionalProperties": false
  },
  "annotations": {
    "readOnlyHint": false,
    "destructiveHint": false,
    "idempotentHint": false
  }
}
approve_cosigner_action 1 change
{
  "name": "approve_cosigner_action",
  "description": "Approve a pending action as co-signer. Use with list_pending_cosigner_approvals.",
  "inputSchema": {
    "type": "object",
    "required": [
      "pendingApprovalId"
    ],
    "properties": {
      "pendingApprovalId": {
        "type": "string"
      }
    },
    "additionalProperties": false
  },
  "annotations": {
    "readOnlyHint": false,
    "destructiveHint": false,
    "idempotentHint": false
  }
}

Get alerted

Get an email or webhook when this server's readiness drops by 10+ points, tool-poisoning text appears, or a tool breaks:

curl -X POST https://glimind.com/v1/subscriptions -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"tools":["mcp-registry/io.github.rebelartists/fortfi-treasury-mcp"],"email":"[email protected]"}'

Agents: watch_tool({"toolId": "mcp-registry/io.github.rebelartists/fortfi-treasury-mcp"}) over MCP.

Passed

Largest tool definitions

Static checks of the advertised tools/list (schema, descriptions, annotations, tool-poisoning patterns, names, size) plus observed protocol, uptime, latency and contract changes. Read-only: no tool is ever called. Weights: schema 15, docs 20, safety 15, efficiency 15, compatibility 15, protocol 5, reliability 10, stability 5. Token counts are estimates (~3.6 characters per token).

Operator? Fix these, then re-check live. Embed the readiness badge:

Markdown
[![MCP agent-readiness](https://glimind.com/v1/readiness/badge/mcp-registry%2Fio.github.rebelartists%2Ffortfi-treasury-mcp.svg)](https://glimind.com/server/mcp-registry%2Fio.github.rebelartists%2Ffortfi-treasury-mcp?ref=badge)
HTML
<a href="https://glimind.com/server/mcp-registry%2Fio.github.rebelartists%2Ffortfi-treasury-mcp?ref=badge"><img src="https://glimind.com/v1/readiness/badge/mcp-registry%2Fio.github.rebelartists%2Ffortfi-treasury-mcp.svg" alt="MCP agent-readiness"></a>
reStructuredText
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   :target: https://glimind.com/server/mcp-registry%2Fio.github.rebelartists%2Ffortfi-treasury-mcp?ref=badge
   :alt: MCP agent-readiness

Tool-definition log

Glimind records every version of this server's tool definitions in a signed, append-only transparency log. Current manifest sha256:c2fd75b1153dd533…, first seen 2026-10-20, included at leaf 31192 of 38,200. Version history · verify what your client received.

Tools (133)

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Claude Code

claude mcp add --transport http glimind https://glimind.com/mcp

Claude Desktop · Windsurf · Cline (mcpServers JSON)

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "glimind": {
      "type": "http",
      "url": "https://glimind.com/mcp"
    }
  }
}

FAQ

Is the Rebelartists Fortfi Treasury MCP server down right now?

As of 2026-10-21 07:12 UTC, the Rebelartists Fortfi Treasury MCP server is up with a Glimind reliability score of 97/100 (grade A). Over the last 30 days it answered 100% of Glimind's liveness checks. It had 4 outages in 90 days, with a median recovery of 10 minutes.

How many tools does Rebelartists Fortfi Treasury MCP server provide?

Rebelartists Fortfi Treasury MCP server advertises 133 tools, including accept_cosigner_invite, add_recipient, approve_cosigner_action, approve_recipient, cancel_governance_change.

How do I install Rebelartists Fortfi Treasury MCP server?

Point your MCP client at this streamable-http endpoint: https://fortfiapp.com/api/mcp

Is the Rebelartists Fortfi Treasury MCP server safe to connect to an AI agent?

Glimind scanned all 133 tool definitions for tool-poisoning patterns — hidden or invisible characters, instructions that override the model, concealment from the user, requests to read credential or MCP config files, conversation exfiltration and cross-tool shadowing — and found none. This checks what the server tells the model, not what its code does; review the source before granting access to sensitive data.

Operator of Rebelartists Fortfi Treasury MCP server?

Status page: 90-day uptime, every outage and how long it lasted.

Claim this listing to get the Verified operator marker, a remediation checklist and owner analytics, or embed the live badge from any of the tool pages above. Maintainers: alerts, deploy attestation and monthly reports.

Status is an automated estimate from Glimind's liveness checks (handshake and tool listing only; no tool is ever called) and may lag or differ from your network. Glimind is not affiliated with this server or its operator. Operator? Request a correction or opt out at https://glimind.com/opt-out.

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